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NOTES

Establishing an Aggressive Legal
Framework for the Future of
Wind Energy in Europe
ABSTRACT

Europe is the world's frontrunner in wind energy, and
European governments are committed to aiding renewable
energy entrepreneurs and investors. In April 2009, the EU
passed a new Climate Action Directive. The Directive set goals
for both increased use of renewable energy and decreases in
greenhouse gas emissions. Despite this legislative success, the
Climate Action Directive was widely criticized as insufficient
and ineffective. Indeed, there are numerous substantive
concessions given to industry in the emission reduction portion
of the Directive. Dissenters argued the weaknesses of the
emissions reduction Directive squandered the EU's opportunity
to be a world leader in energy reform. This Note argues
otherwise, proposing that the shortcomings in the emissions
reduction portion of the Directive in fact present great
opportunity to develop and promote the renewable energy
portion of the Directive. In particular,this Note argues there are
unique regulatory opportunities for wind power to recoup the
energy reform losses created by the shortcomings in the
emissions reductionplan.
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THE FUTURE OF WIND ENERGY IN EUROPE

I. INTRODUCTION

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has
determined that the main anthropogenic cause of global warming is
the burning of fossil fuels that release carbon dioxide into the Earth's
atmosphere. 1 Carbon dioxide is a so-called greenhouse gas because it
allows light and heat from the sun to enter the Earth's atmosphere
but does not allow light back out, thus trapping the heat and
warming the Earth's climate over time. 2 By reducing the amount of
carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere, renewable energy plays
an important role in combating climate change. 3 While many sources
of renewable energy were developed only recently, wind technology
made its debut approximately 2,000 years ago, 4 and humans first
5
used wind turbines to generate electricity over 100 years ago.
Today, policymakers and investors worldwide are paying renewed
attention to wind energy. Investment in wind energy reduces carbon
emissions, provides security of energy supply, reduces dependence on
increasingly expensive and volatile oil supplies, and has the potential
6
to create hundreds of thousands of new jobs.
Europe is the world's frontrunner in wind energy, 7 and European
energy
are
committed
to aiding renewable
governments
entrepreneurs and investors.8 The European Union (EU) holds a 70%
world market share in renewable energy 9 and added 8.5 gigawatts

1.
See WORKING GROUP III CONTRIBUTION, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION 102 [hereinafter IPCC

("The
2007 Report],
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg3.htm
predominant sources of the increase in GHGs are from the combustion of fossil fuels.").
2.
SCOTT W. HEABERLIN, A CASE FOR NUCLEAR-GENERATED ELECTRICITY 14
(2004).
3.
Xiaodong Wang, Legal and Policy Frameworks for Renewable Energy to
Mitigate Climate Change, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POLY 17, 17 (2007).
Bent Ole Gram Mortensen, International Experience of Wind Energy, 2
4.
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 179, 180 (2008).
5.
Id.
6.
EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASSOC., MAKING 180 GW A REALITY BY 2020, at 2
(2008), available at http://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/ewea-documents/documents/news_
releases/position-paperFINALVERSION.pdf.
7.
Id.
8.
James Kanter, Europe Encouraging Clean Energy Industry, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 2007, at C3.
Mortensen, supra note 4, at 181, available at http://www.gwec.nettuploads/
9.
medial06-02PRGlobalStatistics_2005.pdf (citing Press Release, Global Wind Energy
Council, Record Year for Wind Energy: Global Wind Power Mkt. Increased by 40.5% in
2005 (Feb. 17, 2006)).
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(GW) of new capacity from wind energy in 2007 alone. 10 Forty
percent of new power installations built in Europe in 2007 were wind
power installations, making wind "the fastest growing powergenerating technology in Europe."" So too have the EU legislative
bodies been champions of wind power. In 2001, the EU passed
Directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion of electricity from renewable
energy resources. 12 Commentators call this Directive "the single
most globally important case of legislation for wind energy. ' 13 EU
Member States have worked from the institutional framework of the
Directive to develop the beginnings of national regulatory and
economic mechanisms to reach renewable energy goals. 14 In January
2008, a new Proposal for a Directive on renewable energy established
a mandatory goal of renewable energy for at least 20% of European
energy consumption by 2020.15
Similarly, in March 2007, the
European Council called for a 20% decrease in carbon emissions by
2020 through a cap-and-trade emissions reduction scheme. 16 In April
2009, the EU Parliament passed a pair of Directives implementing
17
these Proposals (Climate Action and Renewable Energy Package).
Despite these legislative advancements, many criticize the
18
Climate Action and Renewable Energy Package as insufficient.
There are numerous substantive concessions given to industry in the
emissions-reduction cap-and-trade Directive 2009/29/EC (2009

10.
GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, GLOBAL WIND 2007 REPORT 30 (2007),
available at http://www.gwec.net/index.php?id=90.
11.
Id.
12.
Council Directive 2001/77/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 283).
13.
European Wind Energy Association, Key Aspects of the RES-E Directive
77/2001/EC, http://www.ewea.org/index.php?id=197 (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
14.
See id. ("[T~he EU legislation sparked the adoption of legal frameworks
in... EU countries ... ").
15.
Commission of the European Communities Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliamentand of the Council on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from
Renewable Resources, at 8, COM (2008) 30 final (Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Jan. 2008
Proposed Directive].
16.
See Directive 2009/29/EC, Amending Directive 2003/87/EC So As To
Improve and Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme of the
Community, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 63 para. 3.
17.
Directive 2009/28/EC, On the Promotion of the Use of Energy from
Renewable Sources and Amending and Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC
and 2003/30/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 16-62 [hereinafter 2009 Renewable Energy
Directive]; Directive 2009/29/EC, Amending Directive 2003/87/EC So As To Improve
and Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme of the
Community, 2009 O.J. (L 140) [hereinafter 2009 Emissions Trading Scheme Directive].
18.
See James Kanter, Defanged E.U. Climate Plan Still Has (Some) Teeth,
New York Times Green Inc., http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/15/defanged-euclimate-plan-still-has-some-teeth/?scp=l&sq=defanged%20e.u.&st=cse (Dec. 15, 2008,
06:21 EST) ("Environmental groups called the deal a disaster.").
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Emissions Trading Scheme Directive). 19 Dissenters argue that the
weakened 2009 Emissions Trading Scheme Directive has squandered
the EU's opportunity to be a world leader in energy reform as the
2009 UN Climate Conference in Copenhagen approaches. 20 This
Note argues otherwise: The shortcomings of the 2009 Emissions
Trading Scheme Directive present a great opportunity to implement
proposals for the increased use of renewable energy through the
development of Directive 2009/28/EC (2009 Renewable Energy
Directive). In particular, this Note argues that there are unique
opportunities for wind power to recoup the energy reform losses
created by the shortcomings in the emissions reduction plan.
Energy supplies over the long-term are expected to rely heavily
on energy from renewable sources. 21 So long as that remains the
case, now is the time for EU Member States to implement broad,
aggressive policies that support the development of wind and other
renewable energies. This Note provides an argument for distilling
and synthesizing the support policies developed throughout Europe
over the last decade in a way that presents a bold legal path forward
for wind energy in the EU. Fortifying and expanding the European
wind energy industry is the best way to remedy the failures of the
emissions reduction program. Furthermore, EU investment in wind
and renewable energies mitigates concerns that attention to climate
change necessarily means a threat to jobs and economies.
Part II of this Note examines the general need for government
regulation to support the development of wind energy in the
European market. Part III presents the major support schemes
employed by European governments to promote the development of
Part IV analyzes the additional supplemental
wind energy.
regulations needed for any major renewable energy legislation to
succeed. Part V analyzes the successes and failures of the widely
criticized Climate Action and Renewable Energy Package. Part VI
argues that given the EU's imperfect emissions reduction program
against the backdrop of a declining global economy, there is both
immediate need and ripe opportunity for the EU to inject additional

19.
Press Release, Greenpeace, Parliament Adoption of Climate Deal Forfeits
EU Role as Climate Leader (Dec. 17, 2008), available at http://www.greenpeace.org/euunitlpress-centre/press-releases2/Parliament-adoption-of-climate-deal.
20.
James Kanter & Stephen Castle, European Leaders Agree on Weakened
Times Green Inc., http://greeninc.blogs.
Plan to Reduce Emissions, New York
=
nytimes.com12008/12/12/eu-considering-weaker-co2-reduction-plans/?scp=l&sq
European%20Leaders%2OAgree%20on%2OWeakened%20Plan%20to%20Reduce%2OEm
issions&st=cse (Dec. 12, 2008, 07:08 EST).
Pablo del Rio, A European-Wide Harmonized Tradable Green Certificate
21.
Scheme for Renewable Energy: Is it Really So Beneficial?, 33 ENERGY POL'Y 1239, 1239
(2005).
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bold, community-wide regulations for the promotion of wind and
renewable energy.

II. THE NEED FOR REGULATORY INCENTIVES IN WIND
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

A. Market Barriersand Externalities
Despite the strong environmental advantages obtained by the
introduction of native, local renewable energy, wind companies and
wind investors face a steep climb as new entrants in the European
energy market. 22 Renewable energy companies must compete with
conventional fossil fuel plants that have been operating comfortably
for decades in a monopoly market. 23 Many of these companies enjoy
economies of scale due to vertical integration that new renewable
energy producers are unable to achieve. 24 Furthermore, because
producing electricity with coal and gas does not internalize the social
costs of production, there is a market failure that puts renewable
electricity at a competitive disadvantage against energy produced
25
from fossil fuels.
All electricity-generating technology produces some pollution or
has some negative impact on the environment. 26 For example,
emissions during construction and operation of any plant-even a
wind farm-cause quantifiable damage to human health and the
environment. 27 This damage is termed an "externality" because
energy producers do not pay for these costs" to the human health and
environment, nor do they pass the costs on to consumers. 28 Costs are
considered internalized only when the polluter itself pays for the
damage it causes to human health and the environment. 29 If the
external costs of electricity produced from coal and oil in the EU were
taken into account, it is estimated that the cost of electricity in the
30
EU would double.

22.
23.

European Wind Energy Association, supra note 13.
Id.

24.
Id.
25.
EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY Assoc., SUPPORT SCHEMES FOR RENEWABLE
ENERGY 15 (2005), available at http://www.ewea.org/fileadminiewea-documents/
documents/projects/rexpansion050620 eweareport.pdf.
26.
Id. at 10.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30.
Id. at 11.
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Electricity generated from wind and other renewable sources has
less external cost than energy generated from fossil fuels. 3 1 Wind
technology has particularly low external costs, even when compared
to other renewable energies. 32 As a result, there is a market failure
that puts wind at a competitive disadvantage with fossil fuels. 33 That
is, "[i]f externalities were incorporated in... market prices, the
perceived cost of renewable energy would be practically unchanged,
whereas the perceived low cost of conventional technologies ... would
increase dramatically .... -34 Thus, by incorrectly pricing the full
cost of energy produced from the burning of fossil fuels, the market
fails by making that technology appear competitively priced, when
renewable energies are actually cheaper over the long term.
Where the cost of externalities is not taken into account, it is
difficult for developers of wind energy to compete in the market
without government aid and intervention. One way of leveling the
market is to impose a "polluter pays" principle:
By compelling the polluter to bear the expense, the cost of these clean
up measures is reflected in the cost of the goods and services that
generate the pollution through their production or consumption. When
the price of goods and services reflects their environmental costs,
consumers are not challenged to gather and consider Information
concerning a good's or service's effect on the environment. Rather,
because consumers prefer the least expensive goods and services, the
consumer generally makes a decision based on price alone, in which the
social and environmental costs of contamination are already embedded.
Consequently, the polluter pays principle ensures that the choices made
in the self-interest of the consumer further environmental
35
responsibility.

In the absence of such a method of internalizing the costs of
electricity produced from fossil fuels, the next best alternative is for
EU Member States to provide direct support to the renewable energy
These
industry by enacting regulatory support mechanisms.3 6
regulatory schemes could provide the long-term price stability
37
essential to attracting investors to the renewable energy market.

Id. at 12, 14.
31.
32.
Steven Ferrey, Why Electricity Matters, Developing Nations Matter, and
Asia Matters Most of All, N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 113, 139-40 (2007) (explaining that the
cost of externalities associated with wind is 0.1 cents/kWh, solar is 0.4 cents/kWh, and
biomass is 0.7 cents/kWh).
33.
EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASSOC., supra note 25, at 14.
34.
Id at 15.
Eric Larson, Note, Why Environmental Regimes in the U.S., The European
35.
Community, and Japan Have Grown Synonymous with the PolluterPays Principle,38
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 541, 544 (2005).

36.
37.

EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASSOC., supra note 25, at 24.
Wang, supra note 3, at 17.
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B. Security of Energy Supply
The gas and oil pipelines that supply the EU's energy were built
to maximize the profitability and efficiency of energy companies, not
to ensure the EU's energy security.38 The EU Commission has
determined that the European Union's dependence on foreign energy
"threatens its security of supply and implies higher prices. '3 9 The
fact that a large percentage of the world's known remaining oil
reserves are in a small group of countries that are unreliable
suppliers creates this insecurity. 40
Additionally, because global
demand for energy is expected to outpace supply, experts predict
sharp rises in price. 4 1 Thus, the case for government support of wind
energy is compelling from a security of supply point of view.
Renewable and wind energy strengthens the security of energy
supply by "increasing the share of domestically produced energy,
diversifying the fuel mix ... and increasing the proportion of energy
obtained from politically stable regions. '42 Wind does not need to be
imported, and utilizing a native, renewable fuel source removes
reliance on the unpredictable price and availability of foreign fossil
43
fuels.
The EU's recent natural gas dispute with Russia highlights the
44
security of supply problem created by reliance on energy imports.
The EU gets close to 25% of its natural gas from Russia via pipelines
that run through Ukraine. 45 On New Year's Day 2009, Russia slowed
46
supplies of natural gas to Ukraine due to a dispute over prices.
Later, all Russian gas supplies to the EU through Ukraine were

38.
Andris Piebalgs, European Responses to Energy Challenges, Remarks at
the EU Energy and Environmental Law and Policy Conference 3 (Jan. 22, 2009),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/18&
format=HTML&aged=O&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
39.
January 2008 Proposed Directive, supra note 15, at 3.
40.
Mortenson, supra note 4, at 184 (citing RISo ENERGY REPORT 4: THE
FUTURE ENERGY SYSTEM-DISTRIBUTED PRODUCTION AND USE 9 (Hans Larsen & Leif

Songerberg Petersen eds., 2005),
report4/ris-r- 1534.pdf).
41.

available at http://www.risoe.dk/rispubl/energy-

Id.

42.
Renewable Energy Road Map: Renewable Energies in the 21st Century:
Building a More Sustainable Future, at 14, COM, (2007) 848 final (Jan. 1, 2007),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy-policyldoc/03_renewable-energyroadmap-en.pdf [hereinafter 2007 Renewable Energy Roadmap].
43.
Id. at 3.
44.
Posting of Keith Johnson to WSJ Blogs: Environmental Capital, Get Smart:
More
Calls
for Energy
Efficiency to
Meet Demand, http://blogs.wsj.com/
environmentalcapitall2009/01/22/get-smart-more-calls-for-energy-efficiency.to-meet-demand
(Jan. 22, 2009, 09:58 EST).
45.
Alan Cullison, Europe Waits to See if Gas Will Flow, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123232859990694389.html.
46.
Id.
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entirely cut off.4 7 The crisis lasted over a week, causing large
numbers of Europeans to go without heat during the cold winter, and
even forcing factories to halt operations. 48 Even after Russian and
Ukrainian leaders reached an agreement to resume the flow of gas,
EU leaders were forced to watch from afar and hope the deal would
Diversification of energy security, including
not fall apart. 49
producing more energy from indigenous, renewable wind, would
enable the EU to better handle such short-term disruptions in its
energy supply.
Wind energy holds matters in a security of supply analysis
because wind turbines yield a positive energy balance.5 0 That is, any
given wind turbine produces a greater amount of energy in its
lifetime than is needed to initially construct the turbine.5 1 Some
52
turbines recoup their cost as quickly as within one year.
Furthermore, wind is comfortably immune to fluctuations in the price
53
of fossil fuels, and it is almost always cheap because wind is free.
Thus, the marginal cost of producing each additional unit of energy
from wind is almost zero. 54 Wind is also in the best position to
expand compared to other sources of renewable energy. Over half of
the current renewable energy supply in Europe comes from
hydropower.5 5 This amount represents nearly the full extent of
Europe's ability to generate power from water sources.5 6 As a result,
wind energy could constitute the largest growing renewable energy
supplier as the EU strives to meet its 20% target.5 7 Consequently,
the European Commission projects that 12% of the EU's electricity
consumption will come from wind energy by 2020, thus replacing
hydrological power as the main source of renewable energy
58
throughout the EU.
Finally, the intermittent nature of wind energy does not pose a
threat to security of supply. Critics of wind power suggest that if

47.
Id.
48.
John W. Miller & Andrew Osborn, Standoff Exposes EU Weaknesses,
Analysts Say, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB123192898866080831.html.
Cullison, supra note 45.
49.
Mortenson, supra note 4, at 184.
50.
Id.
51.
52.
Id.
53.

The Economics of Renewables, ECONOMIST, July 7, 2007, www.economist.com/

finance/displaystory.cfm?story-id=9447965.
Ferrey, supra note 32, at 144.
54.
Boost Wind Industry,
Set to
EU Legislation
EWEA Chief:
55.
www.euractiv.com/en/energy/ewea.chief-eu-legislation-set-boost-wind-industry/article178688 (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
Id.
56.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
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Europeans rely on wind turbines, there is a risk that the wind will
stop blowing and energy will become scarce. 59 However, the EU
already has protections built into energy systems that eliminate the
risk of a large power outage.60
First, the European energy
infrastructure already holds a large amount of reserve capacity to
guard against wind variability.6 1 Second, as energy grids become
connected over larger geographical areas and across countries, the
additional capacity from the interconnected system helps balance any
variations in wind supply. 62 In short, "the bigger the geographical
area is, the less volatility you'll have because the wind will be likely
to blow somewhere within that area. '63 As a result, what matters is
total production of all turbines in a system, not whether or not the
64
wind is blowing any given turbine at any particular time.
C. Impact of the Declining Global Economy
Over time Europeans have grown used to the idea that energy is
cheap, plentiful, and virtually unlimited.6 5 Prospects for success
among renewable-energy companies are currently threatened by the
once again declining cost of energy and the tightening credit
market. 66 Over a three-month period in 2008, renewable energy
stocks dropped 45%.67 However, that price decrease must be viewed
against the backdrop of the recent and continuing volatility of oil
prices, which has underscored the fact that fossil fuels will always be
a finite resource. 68 Nevertheless, the global economic downturn has
taken climate initiatives off the top of the legislative priority list in
the EU. 69 EU leaders are being pressured to focus on the economy
and creating new jobs. 70 For example, in Germany, politicians facing
reelection in 2009 are likely to react to average workers' concerns

59.
See id. (posing a question that represents this concern).
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Piebalgs, supranote 38, at 2.
66.
Tom Wright, Wind Shifts for Renewable Energy As Oil Price Sinks, Money Gets
Tight, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12244619955084
8849.html?mod=googlenews-wsj.
67.
Id. During the same period, the Dow Jones Industrials Average dropped by
a relatively modest 23%. Id.
68.
See generally Kurt Cobb, Oil Prices and the Mayflower Problem, SCITIZEN,
Aug. 29, 2008, http://scitizen.com/stories/Future-Energies/2008/08Oil-Prices-and-theMayflower-Problem/ (discussing the use of oil prices as a gauge for scarcity).
69.
Benny Peiser, Op-Ed., Cooling on Global Warming, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15,
2008, http://online.wsj.com/articleISB122937766062908297.html.
70.
Id.
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about job assurance, at the expense of tackling climate change
issues. 71 As the economy tightens, climate regulations are being
' 72
more closely scrutinized to be sure they are "truly cost-effective.
Without government incentives to attract investors, many renewable
energy companies are struggling to attract badly needed long-term
funding. 73 Part VI of this Note argues that the current government
fear of investment in renewable energy is misapplied as a reaction to
the economic downturn. Rather, an aggressive legal framework that
provides a regulatory base for smart government investment in wind
energy can be a solution that both provides jobs and an economic
stimulus, while letting Europe continue as a leader in wind
development.
D. The Role of Government Action in EncouragingRenewable
Energy Development
Wind power cannot be a viable market entrant without a
regulatory incentive system to attract producers and investors in the
business community. 74 Given the sharp environmental externalities,
some commentators have suggested the most efficient solution to
level the market is the implementation of an environmental tax on
producers of non-renewable energy for the cost of negative
75
externalities harmful to human health and the environment.
However, such a provision is unlikely due to the considerable political
downsides associated with levying new taxes.7 6 As a result, proactive
government incentives are necessary to level the playing field and to
allow wind energy to compete fairly with traditional energy producers
in the absence of a mechanism for internalizing external costs of nonrenewable energy production. 77
Further, commentators credit
government action with making Europe an attractive target for
investment in renewable energy. 78 Government-generated regulatory

71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
Wright, supra note 66.
74.
Mortensen, supra note 4, at 193.
75.
E.g., Philippe Menanteau et al., Prices Versus Quantities: Choosing Policies
for Promoting the Development of Renewable Energy, 31 ENERGY POLY 799, 800 (2003)
("Ideally, the simplest, most efficient solution for reestablishing fair competition
between power generation technologies would be to correct the market imperfections by
implementing an optimum environmental tax.").
76.
Id. The subjective merits of such a tax are beyond the scope of this note.
77.
See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing externalization of social costs in
traditional energy production).
78.

See ERNST & YOUNG, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS

INDICES 8 (2009), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Renewable_
energy-country-attractiveness_indicesAugust 2009/$FILE/Renewable-energycountr
y-attractivenessindicesAugust%202009.pdf.
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support schemes help stabilize the market for renewable energy and
help renewable energy market entrants compete with market
failure.7 9 Thus, it is essential that the EU and individual Member
States work together to adopt a set of legal, political, and regulatory
regimes that minimize risk for large-scale, long-term investors.8 0 In
particular, the EU can implement binding emissions reduction
targets to serve as a catalyst for wind energy development and
8
investor commitment, and to encourage research. '

III. MAJOR EU

SUPPORT SCHEMES DEVELOPED BY

EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

A. The Legal Basis for Support Schemes for Renewable Energy
In recognition of the barriers to entering the wind market and
the corresponding need to set targets for Members States, the EU has
established a legal framework for the promotion of renewable energy
resources.8 2 Article 174 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Union (European Treaty) establishes power for the Community to
protect the quality of the environment and human health.8 3 The
European Treaty also grants broad power to impose binding
obligations on Member States for measures directly affecting the
internal European market.8 4 Under the Treaty, any measure that
"significantly affect[s] a Member State's choice between different
energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply" must
pass unanimously and only after consultation with the European
Parliament and other special committees.8 5 Unanimous support for
the EU-wide emissions reduction and renewable energy scheme cuts
both ways: It shows consensus is possible among the various Member
States on a politically-heated issue, but it also suggests large
concessions to powerful constituencies may be needed to achieve
unanimous support for renewable energy producers at the expense of
the traditional energy industry.

79.
80.

Wang, supra note 3 at 20.
Id. at 17.

81.

EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASSOC., supra note 6, at 2.

82.
European Wind Energy Association, supra note 13.
83.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
tit. XIX, art. 174(1), Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33.
84.
Id. arts. 94, 95(3).
85.
Id. art. 175(2)(c).
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In 2001, the EU adopted Directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion
of electricity from renewable sources.8 6 This legislation led to the
development of legal frameworks for wind energy in countries
throughout Europe.8 7
Additionally, in October 2003, Directive
2003/87/EC laid the legal foundation for a cap-and-trade emissions
reduction program in Europe,88 and in January 2005, the EU entered
into the largest multinational emissions trading program in the
world.8 9 In January of 2008, a new Proposal for a Directive on
Renewable Energy was adopted, proposing a mandatory goal of
renewable energy of at least 20% of European Energy consumption by
2020.90
Finally, in April 2009, the European Parliament
unanimously adopted the Climate Action and Renewable Energy
Package, including Directives for both the promotion of the use of
energy from renewable sources 91 and for complex amendments to the
92
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system.
No Directive mandates that Members States choose a single
support scheme to promote the development of wind energy to meet
the Directives' goals for renewable energy. 9 3 Rather, Members States
are free to work towards the goals set by the Directives by choosing
from a variety of support mechanisms. 94 For example, the December
2008 Directive defines Support Scheme as:
any instrument ... applied by a Member State ... that promotes the

use of energy from renewable sources by reducing the cost of this
energy, increasing the price at which it can be sold, or increasing, by
means of a renewable energy obligation or otherwise, the volume of
95
such energy purchased.

Examples of such schemes include "investment aid, tax exemptions or
reductions, tax refunds, ... green certificates, and direct price
'9 6
support schemes including feed-in tariffs and premium payments.
While the Directive requires Member States to introduce some
measure to increase the percentage of electricity generated in their

86.
Council Directive 2001/77, On the Promotion of Electricity Produced from
Renewable Energy Sources in the Internal Electricity Market, 2001 O.J. (L 283) 33
(EC).
87.
European Wind Energy Association, supra note 13.
88.
Emission Trading System (EU ETS), http://ec.europa.eulenvironment/
climat/emissionlindex en.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
89.
Id.
90.
January 2008 Proposed Directive, supra note 15.
91.
See generally 2009 Renewable Energy Directive, supra note 17 (promoting
the use of renewable energy sources).
92.
See generally 2009 Emissions Trading Scheme Directive, supra note 17
(improving and amending "the greenhouse gas emission trading scheme").
93.
GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, supranote 10, at 31.
94.
2009 Renewable Energy Directive, supra note 17, pmbl., para. 25.
95.
Id. art. 2(k).
96.
Id.

1608

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42:1595

countries from renewable sources, it does not mandate the use of any
particular defined support schemes. 97 The 2009 Emissions Trading
Directive somewhat modifies this framework by imposing an EU-wide
cap-and-trade scheme to incentivize fossil fuel burning energy
producers to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.98 However, the 2009
Renewable Energy Directive still leaves the development of national
schemes for increasing renewable energy production to the Member
States' individual discretion. 9
B. Tax Credits and Investment Incentives
Direct tax and financial incentives can help break down barriers
to entry for wind energy producers.
Globally, such policies
represented the earliest means of government support for
renewables. 0 0° Governments implemented these programs with the
goal of reducing the start-up costs of constructing wind turbines to
attract committed long-term investors.101
These financial
mechanisms also operated by reducing operating costs, improving
cash flow through tax credits and carbon credits, and providing
guarantees for certain loans. 0 2
However, tax credits are only
attractive when businesses are operating at a profit and have taxable
income they wish to offset.1 0 3 The recent economic downturn has
limited the number of such companies.' 0 4
Furthermore, tax
incentives are often unattractive to long-term investors because they
could be cancelled at any time subject to the whim of the
legislature. 105
Government investment incentives are also used to build the
necessary infrastructure to connect wind turbines to the energy grid,
provide research and development to wind entrepreneurs, and
implement marketing and public interest campaigns to boost public
support for the wind renewables market. 10 6 These early programs

97.
GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 31.
98.
See 2009 Emissions Trading Scheme Directive, supra note 17, pmbl., para.
42 (providing for emissions caps).
99.
2009 Renewable Energy Directive, supra note 17, pmbl., para. 74.
100.
See EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASSOC., supra note 25, at 25 (describing
historical means of encouraging investments).
101.
Id.; see also Wang, supra note 3 (discussing various policies to encourage
"large-scale investment in renewable energy").
102.
Wang, supranote 3, at 18.
103.
Posting of Keith Johnson to WSJ Blogs: Environmental Capital, Clean
Energy: How Do You Jumpstart It?, http://blogs.wsj.com/environmentalcapital2009/O1/
21/clean-energy-how-do-you-jumpstart-it (Jan. 21, 2009, 08:54 EST).
104.
Id.
105.
See id. (describing the system of perennial Congressional renewal in the
U.S.).
106.
Wang, supra note 3 at 18.
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were most successful in the 1980s in Germany and Denmark where,
for example, schemes for providing preferred loans for the
10 7
construction of wind turbines were enacted.
C. ProductionSubsidies and Feed-in Tariffs
Investment subsidies alone do not sufficiently support technology
development because they only incentivize increased output, not
optimal planning or efficient production over the long term. 0 8 Thus,
economic support mechanisms, in addition to tax or investment
subsidies, come in the form of production subsidies.' 0 9 Such subsidies
have been used to regulate water utilities in Eastern Europe and
Central Asia. 110 One of the most common methods of supporting
wind power via production subsidies is to ensure that the electricity
produced can be sold at a profitable price. 111 However, this so-called
cost-plus tariff is criticized because critics argue that guaranteeing a
price at which electricity can be sold for a profit provides no incentive
112
for efficient production and is implemented relatively rarely.
A more common alternative production subsidy is a price-based
fixed feed-in tariff (FIT). FIT schemes provide long-term investor
confidence by fixing a mandatory subsidy for the purchase and sale of
electricity. 113 That is, the price paid to those who produce electricity
from renewable-rather than traditional-sources would be at least
equal to the wholesale price of electricity paid to traditional
producers, plus a premium reflecting the value of the social and
environmental benefits of the renewable energy. 114 Under the FIT
scheme, wind farm operators are paid a fixed price for every kilowatthour of electricity they produce. 115 The premium between the cost of
the tariff and the actual market price of electricity is paid by tax
revenue or by the consumer. 1 16 This premium makes it possible for

107.

EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASSOC., supra note 25, at 25.

108.
See Mortensen, supra note 4, at 197 (noting that investment subsidies
historically "focused mainly on estimated output or available capacity").
109.
Mortensen, supra note 4, at 197.
110.

ORG. FOR ECON. Coop. & DEV., URBAN WATER REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE,

CAUCASUS, AND CENTRAL ASIA 43 (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/l/
45/14626557.pdf.
111.
Mortensen, supra note 4, at 199.
112.
Id. at 198.
113.
Wang, supra note 3, at 18.
114.
VOLKMAR LAUBER, THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN UNION POLICY ON SUPPORT
SCHEMES FOR ELECTRICITY FROM RENEWABLE SOURCES 6 (2005), available at

http://www.wind-works.org/FeedLaws/Lauber%20-%20EU%20policy%20on%20support%2O
schemes%20for%20electricity%20from%20renewable%20energy/o20sources%20-%20&
E%20-%2018%200ct%2005.pdf.
115,

EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASSOC., supra note 25, at 31.

116.

Id.
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renewable energy start-ups to compete against fossil fuel burning
producers that externalize the costs of their energy production. FIT
schemes appeared on the EU radar at the end of 1996 when
Parliament expressed concerns over the ability of renewable energy to
compete in an unregulated free market.1 1 7 Countries across Europe
have adopted mechanisms based on FIT schemes: 11 8 these systems
are the main support scheme Germany, Spain, and France use to
achieve the renewable energy goals established by the EU 2001
Directive. 119 As of August 2006, eighteen of the then twenty-five EU
120
countries used feed-in tariffs.
However, FIT schemes are not without detractors. The nature of
the FIT makes it impossible to predict how expensive the scheme will
be over time. 121 That is, where the price of the legislatively-set tariff
remains constant, but the market price of electricity fluctuates, the
122
cost consumers bear changes with the market price of electricity.
Additionally, because operators cannot predict when the tariff level
may change, they must account for a risk premium when planning
their projects, thus increasing the overall cost to consumers. 123 A
market-based criticism says that feed-in tariffs shelter renewable
energy developers from price competition; thus, any increases in
124
capacity have not been achieved in an efficient manner.
Despite these arguments, countries favor FIT schemes because
they are simple and encourage efficient planning by wind farm
operators. 125 Investors also seem to prefer these tariffs despite the
risk that the tariffs could change on a legislative whim. 126 One
explanation for such enthusiasm is that FIT schemes require little
regulation as compared to other support schemes. 12 7 One report has
even called this relative absence of administrative bureaucracy
"essential" to the establishment of long-term security. 128
The chief predictor in whether a FIT scheme is successful in
attracting investment is the value of the tariff.129 Chances for
success may also be increased where a government can reduce the

117.
Id. at 7.
118.
Id. at 31.
119.
Mortensen, supra note 4, at 199 & n.120.
120.
European Wind Energy Association, supra note 13.
121.
EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASSOC., supra note 25, at 31.
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
124.
Lucy Butler & Karsten Neuhoff, Comparison of Feed-In Tariff, Quota and
Auction Mechanisms to Support Wind Power Development, 33 RENEWABLE ENERGY
1854 (2008).
125.
EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASSOC., supra note 25, at 31.
126. Mortensen, supranote 4, at 199.
127.
LAUBER, supra note 114, at 11.
128. Id. at 19.
129.
EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASSOC., supra note 25, at 31.
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political risk of the tariffs level being changed or the FIT law being
repealed.' 30
Spain has reduced this political risk by giving
government assurances that no changes will be made in tariff levels
that would result in the bankruptcy of existing wind farms built
Germany has similarly reduced
under previous conditions.'l 3
political risk by guaranteeing payments for twenty years. 132 For
wind energy, Germany guarantees a tariff of 9.1 cents per kilowatt
hour (kWh) for the first five years of a project's operation, and for 6.19
133
cents per kWh for the next fifteen years.
D. Tradable Green Certificates
Under a system of tradable green certificates, a set quota of the
electricity sold on a market must come from renewable energy
sources. 134 Where feed-in tariffs are seen as a price-based scheme,
3 5
green certificates are viewed as a market-based mechanism.'
Specifically, through the sale of certificates, renewable energy
producers are compensated for the competitive price disadvantage of
renewable energy, as well as for the environmental benefits provided
by the renewable energy. 136 Under the tradable green certificate
(TGC) mechanism, the government sets a minimum amount of
electricity that must come from renewable sources in the overall
electricity portfolio for the country. 13 7 As the quota gradually
increases, this system purports to stimulate demand for renewable
energy, which leads to a decrease in demand for conventional energy
and indirectly to a decrease in greenhouse gas emissions.1 38 A
country-wide quota for renewable electricity is set and then
individually applied among producers, distributors, etc.13 9 Energy
producers, distributors, and, in some countries, consumers, may
either generate the required amount of renewable energy on their
own, purchase renewable energy through long-term contracts from
renewable energy generators, or purchase TGCs from other
operators.140

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Butler & Neuoff, supra note 124, at 1855.
Menanteau et al., supra note 75, at 802.
Giovanna Golini, Tradable Green Certificate Systems in the E. U., 26

ENERGY L.J. 111, 112 (2005).

136.

Id. at 114.

137.

EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASSOC., supra note 25, at 31.

138.
139.

Golini, supra note 135, at 112.
Menanteau et al., supra note 75, at 803.

140.

Id.
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Early supporters of green certificates argued that TGCs are the
14 1
regulatory option that best conforms to free market principles
because the market-oriented TGC promotes renewables without
causing the price distortions of a tariff scheme. 14 2 Additionally, the
TGC scheme allows renewable energy to mature and gradually merge
14 3
into a competitive free market with conventional energy.
Supporters say TGCs are effective because they allow for obligated
parties to be flexible in complying with the quota: They can produce
renewable energy themselves, or they can purchase certificates on the
market for certificates. 144 TGC schemes are active in145Britain, Italy,
Belgium, Poland, and Sweden, among other countries.
In an efficient market, the price of a TGC is equal to the market
price for electricity plus the additional cost of new renewable energy
generating capacity. 146 In a market situation where demand for
certificates exceeds supply, renewable energy is being produced at an
amount below the government quota, and the price of certificates
increases. 147 The price will continue to increase until new capacity
can be added to meet the quota, thus creating an incentive for
producers to develop more renewable energy. 148 However, a key
feature of the TGC program is that the certificate price is set on a
daily basis on a market separate from the electricity market. 149 This
An
daily fluctuation of prices makes investors risk averse. 150
additional disadvantage of the TGC is that it is more complex than
tariff-based schemes. 15 1 Quota schemes require more regulatory and
administrative arrangements than FIT mechanisms, 152 and TGCs
require energy producers to be simultaneously active in two financial
153
markets: one for certificates, and one for conventional power.
Finally, TGCs result in an asymmetry of interests between renewable
energy producers and electricity companies: the former prefer long
term contracts in order to minimize risk, while the latter prefer short154
term contracts so as to minimize costs.

141.
Golini, supra note 135, at 114-15.
LAUBER, supra note 114, at 5 (citing Commission Green Paper, Community
142.
Strategy, Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources of Energy, at 34-35, COM (1996)
576 final (Nov. 11, 2001)).
Golini, supra note 135, at 115.
143.
144.
Id.
LAUBER, supra note 114, at 4.
145.
146.
EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASSOC., supra note 25, at 34.
Id. at 35.
147.
Id.
148.
149.
Id. at 34.
Id.
150.
Id. at 35.
151.
LAUBER, supra note 114, at 11.
152.
153.
EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASSOC., supra note 25, at 36.
154.
Id.
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The risk posed to investors by the daily pricing of certificates can
be overcome by implementing effective markets for long-term power
contracts and certificate contracts. 155 The addition of futures or
options markets further reduces this risk by allowing parties to buy
or sell certificates for delivery at a point in the future for a price
agreed on in the present. 156 Additionally, many of the disadvantages
of TGCs are reduced when a '"anking" system is available. A
banking system stabilizes fluctuating prices by giving consumers the
option of buying future production and giving renewable energy
producers the option of selling future production by trading borrowed
certificates. 157 The system further allows wind farm operators and
investors to predict their cash flow with more certainty, which greatly
158
Supplyreduces risk and increases the likelihood of investment.
side remedies to stabilize a TGC regime might also be considered.
For example, a certificate scheme that includes not only wind, but
also several types of clean technology, helps minimize risk of price
fluctuations resulting from an unpredictable supply of wind. 15 9
Some commentators see a TGC scheme as the best regulatory
mechanism for a harmonized, EU-wide support scheme for wind and
renewable energy. 160 For instance, "[a] pan-European TGC scheme
would facilitate the setting and achievement of national [renewable
energy] targets by allowing Member States with a shortage of TGCs
to fulfill their obligations by importing certificates from countries
with a surplus of them.' 16 1 A larger market with more suppliers also
reduces risk to investors by decreasing the risk of volatility of
certificate prices. 162 Individual countries also stand to benefit: if an
EU-wide TGC scheme were utilized, countries could promote and
develop wind and renewable energy at vastly lower costs than if
16 3
countries were limited to their own policies.

Id. at 34.
155.
Id. at 36.
156.
157.
Id.
Id.
158.
Golini, supra note 135, at 116-17.
159.
160.
Id. at 118.
161.
Id.
Id. at 117-18.
162.
163.
del Rio, supra note 21, at 1242. It should be noted, however, that this
particular cost-saving argument applies equally to a hypothetical EU-wide feed-in
tariff scheme.
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IV. A CORRECT PATH FORWARD: NECESSARY COMPONENTS OF
RENEWABLE ENERGY LEGISLATION

The EU actively reviews the status of wind power development
in Europe and is revising its legislative framework moving
forward. 164 According to the European Wind Energy Association, the
primary issue that must be resolved by the EU in the near term is
whether to institute a single EU-wide support scheme for the
development of wind and other renewable energies. 165 Other primary
and secondary issues include grid access, guarantees of origin, and
administrative barriers. 166
Implementation of support schemes,
removal of administrative barriers, and establishing a framework for
grid access can be viewed as a three-legged chair: If one of the legs is
167
removed, the EU's renewable energy market will collapse.
A. Harmonization
The January 2008 Proposed Directive recognizes that Member
States all currently use renewable energy.' 68 As a result, it does not
offer any measures that significantly affect the structure of any
individual Member States' renewable energy support scheme or
require harmonization throughout the EU. 16 9 The December 2008
Directive implements this passive approach. 170 Leading industry
groups support this position, saying too quick a move toward a
171
harmonized system would put European wind technology at risk.
Other commentators say it is simply too soon to implement a
harmonized system throughout the EU. 172 While harmonization
remains a long-term goal, the EU has decided that it would be an
error to pursue this objective in the short term. 173 Commentators on
the other side of the debate recognized as early as 1999 that
"contemporaneous existence of different support schemes was likely

164.
See GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 31 (describing the
European Commission's 2006 Green Paper and 2007 Strategic Energy Review, along
with the EU Heads' of State adoption of a binding target of twenty percent renewable
energy by 2020).
165.
EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASSOc., supra note 6, at 3.
166.
Id.
167.
EWEA Chief: EU Legislation Set to Boost Wind Industry, supra note 55.
168.
January 2008 Proposed Directive, supranote 15, at 9.
169.
Id.
170.
EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASSOC., supra note 6, at 4.
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 31.
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to result in distortions of trade and competition and that these effects
were likely to grow in the coming years" as renewable energy
production increased. 174 Those commentators point to examples such
as the creation of a single market in areas like transport,
telecommunications, and other utilities as support for the increased
efficiency and technological innovations-as well as decreased
175
prices-that come with a harmonized single market.
However, it is the new EU Directive's mandate of a communitywide cap-and-trade program to reduce emissions that embarrasses
the argument that the EU "isn't ready" for a community-wide
regulatory scheme to support the development of renewable energy.
The chief weakness of the December 2008 Directive is not-as most
commentators argue-its many concessions to industry that weaken
the emissions reduction scheme. 176 Rather, the Directive fails by not
calling for an EU-wide regulatory support mechanism to make
renewable energy competitive on a community-wide market. The
community-wide cap-and-trade scheme provides an ideal foundation
upon which to build a community-wide feed-in tariff or tradable green
certificate scheme. Harmonizing support schemes throughout Europe
creates a larger, more efficient market with more players and greater
cost savings. A larger wind energy market is also a more stable,
reliable energy market. 177 So long as harmonization is forgone,
economies of scale the size of continental Europe will continue to be
squandered at the expense of human health and the global
environment.
Harmonization would also lead to more efficient development of
wind technology. Rather than being forced to find the best sites for
wind farms within their own borders, EU member states could unite
and take advantage of the best wind farm locations no matter which
country they are located in. This reduction in administrative burdens
increases investor confidence and spurs production, development, and
job creation.' 78 Additionally, a harmonized scheme provides EU
politicians with the protection of majority collective action: none is
responsible for individual successes or failures of the schemes within
his or her own country. As long as EU legislators avoid implementing
a harmonized support scheme for the development of renewable
energies, they cannot say they are implementing wind energy and
creating green jobs in the most efficient, expedited manner available.

174.
LAUBER, supra note 114, at 8.
175.
Id. at 11-12.
176.
See infra Part V.B.
177.
See supra text accompanying notes 59-64 (discussing the benefits of a
larger energy system in guarding against potential shortages in the supply of wind).
178.
See infra Part IV.B.
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B. Other Necessities: Grid Access, Administrative Procedures,
and Guaranteesof Origin
In addition to the challenges presented by the new Directive's
framework, other major barriers to the development of wind energy in
Europe include administrative delays, prohibitive grid access
conditions, and the lack of guarantees of origin. 179 With the new
Directive in place, a primary challenge is to ensure that
implementation provides for rapid integration of renewables into
existing energy markets.'8 0 The wind industry in Greece illustrates
that a sufficient support mechanism does not by itself guarantee
development of wind energy.' 8 ' That country has a high feed-in tariff
supplemented by moderate capital grants, and yet development is
stagnant. 18 2 Despite the value of the tariff, investors are unwilling to
commit to wind projects without an efficient regulatory framework in
place and easy access to the electricity grid system.' 8 3 France faces a
similar problem: it has adequate financial incentives, but grid access
are
stifling
bureaucratic
administrative
structures
and
84
development.'
Countries
must ensure an efficient, easily navigable
administrative process for approval and licensing of wind turbine
construction. The current laws in some Member States are having
the opposite effect. In France, the ZDE Law requires wind farms to
be constructed in designated Wind Power Development Zones in
order to benefit from that country's feed-in tariff program.1 8 5 As a
result, wind turbines are banned in large tracts of land near legally
This 2005
protected natural areas and along flight paths.' 8 6
amendment to France's original 2001 feed-in tariff law has
complicated administrative procedures and resulted in a slowdown in
the growth of the country's wind energy industry.'8 7 Additionally,
planning restrictions are the most common hurdle to development
cited by wind energy producers in the UK.' 8 8 In Germany, by
contrast, wind turbine construction is considered a priority under the
German Federal Building Code.' 8 9 There, municipalities are to give
administrative priority to projects that will utilize wind for energy

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 31.
Piebalgs, supra note 38, at 5.
EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY Assoc., supra note 25, at 31.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32.
GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 33.
Id.
Id.
Butler & Neuhoff, supra note 124, at 1860.
GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 34.
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production. 190 Even with this provision, Germany has its share of
administrative obstacles. For example, restrictions on wind turbine
height have resulted in producers being unable to build turbines tall
enough to maximize their energy-producing potential. 19 1
Guaranteed access to existing electricity grids is vital element to
developing the wind energy industry in the EU. 192 Grid access was
the second most commonly cited barrier to development in a recent
study of German and UK wind producers, second only to
administrative barriers. 193 Thus, the issue of physical access to the
grid is major decisive factor, along price, in establishing a viable wind
Major greenhouse gas emissions-reducing
energy industry. 194
incentives such as feed-in tariffs and cap-and-trade schemes will have
little effect if wind farms are denied the ability to sell their renewable
energy on the grid. 19 5 Some countries may have room for wind
developments to connect to existing grids, while other countries (or
large, modern wind farm developments in any country) could require
Thus, Member States' legislatures
additions to grid capacity. 196
must also speed up authorization procedures for expanding grid
infrastructure. 9 7 Countries must make one of two guarantees: either
priority access (where already-connected wind farm operators are
ensured they will be able to sell and transmit their electricity) or
guaranteed access (ensuring all electricity from renewable sources
198
gets initial access to the grid).
Guarantees of origin prove to the consumer that a given unit of
energy comes from a renewable source. 199 By Directive, EU nations
must "ensure that the origin of electricity produced from renewable
energy sources can be guaranteed as such. '20 0 The guarantee must
provide information on the source from which the electricity was
produced, including the date and place of production. 20 1 Guarantees
of origin are necessary because they facilitate efficient trading of
renewable energy and increase transparency for consumers by
providing a means to differentiate electricity from renewable sources

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
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Id. at 35.
Mortensen, supra note 4, at 195-96.
Butler & Neuoff, supra note 124, at 1860.
Mortensen, supra note 4, at 196.
Id. at 195-96.
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CLOSE-UP 3, available at http://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/eweadocuments/documentsl
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Id.
199.
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Council Directive 2007/77/EC, art. 5, para. 1, 2007 O.J. (L 032).
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and electricity from conventional sources. 20 2 The December 2008 EU
climate change directive takes steps to establish consistency for
guarantees of origin throughout the community. 20 3 First, guarantees
20 4
of origin are to be issued in a standard size of 1 megawatt hour.
Additionally, no more than one guarantee of origin may be issued for
each unit of energy produced. 20 5 To ensure accountability among
renewable energy producers, Member States must take measures to
ensure that the same unit of energy is taken into account and
20 6
guaranteed only once.

V.

SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN THE NEW EU CLIMATE PACKAGE

A. Promotion of the Use of Energy from
Renewable Sources
The EU's 2009 Climate Action and Renewable Energy Package
contains numerous provisions seen as necessary components of
effective legislation designed to promote renewable energy. 20 7 The
2009 Renewable Energy Directive is more successful and represents
fewer concessions to the powerful energy industry interests than the
20 8
emissions allowance trading system discussed in Part V.B below.
The key principles of the January 2008 Proposal for a Renewable
Energy Directive were retained in the December 2008 text adopted by
the European Parliament. 20 9 At its core, the text incorporates a
mandatory target of 20% of overall EU energy production coming
from renewable sources by 2020.210
To achieve this goal, the
Directive establishes legally binding national targets for each
member country. 21'
Furthermore, the Directive declares that
member states "shall introduce" measures designed to meet or exceed
the national goals set out in the text.212 These measures may include
regulatory support schemes as well as cooperative efforts with other
Member States or outside nations. 213 Member States are required to

202.
Ernst Tremmel, Legislative Development: Directive 2001/77/EC On The
Promotion Of Electricity Produced From Renewable Energy Sources In The Electricity
Market, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 363, 364 (2002).
203.
2009 Renewable Energy Directive, supra note 17, art. 15.
204.
Id. art. 15, para. 2.
205.
Id.
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
208.
Id.
209.
EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY Assoc., supra note 197, at 1.
210.
2009 Renewable Energy Directive, supra note 17, art. 3, para. 1.
211.
Id.
212.
Id. art. 3, para. 2.
213.
Id. art. 3, para. 3.

2009]

THE FUTURE OF WIND ENERGY IN EUROPE

1619

adopt National Action Plans (NAPs) that set out the measures to be
taken to achieve the overall national targets 2 14 and submit those
action plans to the EU by June 2010.215
The
Directive
contains strong
provisions
related
to
administrative procedures and regulations. The measures-largely
retained from the January 2008 Proposal for a Directive-will
increase
government
transparency
and
break
down the
administrative barriers faced by entrepreneurs hoping to develop
wind companies. For example, Member States are required to make
all certification and licensing procedures clearly coordinated and
2 16
defined with transparent timetables for permitting procedures.
Additionally, there is a strong information-forcing provision
regarding the processing and certification of applications for
renewable energy installations. 217
In a surprising move, the
Directive allows for "simplified and less burdensome ...procedures"
for smaller projects. 218 Finally, the comprehensive administrative
portion of the Directive includes a provision for consumer education,
which requires member states to develop awareness-raising programs
to inform citizens of the benefits of developing and using renewable
energy. 219
These administrative conditions provide increased
legislative certainty for investors and should decrease the amount of
time new projects take to become operational, thereby helping
member states meet their mandatory 2020 targets.
The adopted Directive also contains strong provisions for
guarantees of origin. The Directive requires member states to ensure
"the origin of electricity produced from renewable sources can be
guaranteed as such ....,,220 Furthermore, Member States are to
ensure that each unit of renewable energy is only taken into account
once 22 1 and that the guarantee of origin does not function as evidence
that a Member State is in compliance with its obligations under
Article 3 to meet mandatory renewable energy targets. 222 These
provisions help legitimize the guarantee of origin program by

214.

Id. art. 4, para. 1.

215. Id. para. 2.
216. Id. art. 1312, para.l(a).
217.
Id. para 1(b).
218. Id. art. 13, para. 12. This provision is surprising in light of the strong
industry lobby surrounding the climate legislation processed, as evidenced by the many
concessions made to industry discussed in Part V.B. Additionally, many large
businesses are taking advantage of economies of scale in the down economy and are
looking to buy up or force out smaller competitors, which makes it unlikely that special
treatment for those small competitors would survive in the final text adopted by the
EU Parliament.
219. Id. art. 14, para. 6.
220.
Id. art. 15, para. 1.
221.
Id. 2.
222.
Id.
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ensuring it will boost consumer confidence in the renewable energy
scheme, as well as by minimizing loopholes for Member States to
comply with their renewable energy targets.
In a step vital to the success of new and developing wind farms,
the Directive requires Member States to take action regarding their
electricity grid to accommodate production from renewable energy
sources. 223 Member States must develop infrastructure, intelligent
networks, and storage systems so new producers can connect to the
grid and sell electricity from renewable sources. 224 In a forwardlooking move, the Directive calls for the grid to be interconnected
between Member States and third-party countries. 225 Member states
are required to provide priority or guaranteed access to producers of
22 6
electricity from renewable sources.
However, the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive is not without
its substantial shortcomings. The lack of a mandatory, harmonized
support scheme will harm renewable energy interests. Only the
legislative certainty that comes with a mandatory, integrated, and
interconnected support scheme will give investors the confidence
needed to provide capital to renewable energy projects during the
economic downturn. The EU's continued failure to endorse a unified
scheme means that individual countries will continue to develop
disparate plans. As these plans become more ingrained in any single
country, the variations between schemes becomes more difficult to
reconcile, and the likelihood of an integrated support scheme
emerging in the future becomes even more unlikely-or at least more
expensive to implement. Additionally, businesses will come to rely on
the support scheme and its corresponding administrative regulations
in the country they start a business in, and they will shape their
practices accordingly.
This will have the long-term effect of
increasing transaction costs and reduces incentives of developing
renewable energy in two or more countries that will inevitably have
variations in their support schemes. As a result, economies of scale
are stymied, growth is capped, and investors are less likely to see
long-term profit potential in wind energy.
B. The Emission Allowance Trading System
The EU has taken the aggressive step of simultaneously
addressing both the increased use and promotion of renewable energy
and reductions in greenhouse gas emissions into the environment.
The two legislative frameworks could be viewed as mutually

223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. art. 16, para. 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 2(b).
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exclusive, with the renewable energy provisions centered on energy
policy and regulation, and the cap-and-trade provisions focused on
emissions and clean air. However, because the EU chose to address
both issues at once, any analysis of the renewable energy directive
would be incomplete without also analyzing the proposed cap-andtrade emissions reduction scheme. Where the cap-and-trade scheme
fails as an effective tool in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, there
is room for renewable energy measures to thrive and curb greenhouse
gas emissions as the amount of energy consumed from renewable
sources increases over time.
The 2009 ETS Directive establishing the EU-wide emissions
trading scheme exists as amendments to the Parliament's original
attempt to establish a cap-and-trade scheme in Directive
2003/87/EC. 227 Under the amended scheme, Member States must
ensure that no facilities in their countries emit greenhouse gasses
without a permit or "allowance. ' 228 Member States establish a plan
for the total number of permits and their allocation. 2 29 Once
countries allocate allowances, companies that emit beyond their
230
allowance must buy more from those companies who emit less.
Thus, a free market for emissions is established where those who can
curb their emissions and sell their allowances are rewarded, and
those who pollute more are forced to pay more. 23 1 While such an
emissions trading system operates only indirectly in terms of
promoting renewable energy, it provides incentives for companies to
emit less and therefore has an immediate, direct impact in the effort
to curb greenhouse gas emissions.
The complexities and concessions of the Amendments are best
evidenced by the evolution of Articles 10 and 11, both of which were
entirely replaced in the 2009 Directive. 232 These articles were
transformed from simple proposals to lengthy, complex schemes with
changes made to the method of distributing allowances and
exceptions carved out for various industries and countries. Where the
original scheme called for 10% of allowances for 2008 to be auctioned
by the countries at a profit, the amended directive calls for free
allocation of allowances for any emitter in operation as of December

227.
See 2009 Emissions Trading Scheme Directive, supra note 17, pmbl., para.
42 (provision for emissions caps).
228.
Id. art. 4.
229.
Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32, art. 9, para. 1 (EC).
230.
CAN Europe, Emission Trading in the EU, http://www.climnet.org/
EUenergy/ET.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
231.
Id.
232.
Compare Directive 2003/87, arts. 10-11, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC)
(including prior articles 10 and 11), with 2009 Emissions Trading Scheme Directive,
supra note 17, arts. 10-11 (replacing former articles 10 and 11).
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31, 2008.233 When allowances are sold for a price (i.e., when they are
"auctioned"), businesses will have an economic incentive to curb
emissions if the cost of doing so is less than the cost of purchasing
additional allowances.
However, where the cost imposed for a
pollution allowance is removed, businesses have no immediate
2 34
incentive to take expensive measures to reduce their emissions.
Moreover, certain manufacturing industry sectors earned concessions
in the final version of the new scheme. For example, while the
January 2008 Proposed Directive called for coal-fired power plants
(major greenhouse gas emitters) to purchase 100% of their pollution
allowances by 2013, that measure is absent from the 2009
Directive. 235 Some countries lobbied hard and earned concessions
that weaken the effectiveness of the bill: for example, steel plants
and chemical factories in Germany enjoy exceptions from the full cap236
and-trade scheme.
It is useful to compare the many concessions of the cap-and-trade
scheme to the provisions of the renewable energy scheme, which
survived almost entirely intact from previous EU proposals and
roadmaps. 237 The continuity in the renewable energy provisions is
evidence of broader, stronger support for government aide for
renewable energy.
Conventional wisdom says that government
injection of capital and support schemes that promote, for example,
the development of wind farms can create jobs and benefit a country's
economy as well as its environment.
Cap-and-trade emissions
reduction schemes, on the other hand, may be more easily viewed as
the sort of increased regulation that is bad for business. These
businesses lobbied harder, and the cap-and-trade legislation was
weakened. 238 That the renewable energy Directive was not met with
the same obstacles is evidence that EU policy makers have political
capital to spend on the continued promotion of renewable energy via
strong regulatory support schemes. A vision of this attractive
regulatory opportunity is laid out in Part VI.

233.
Id.
234.
2009 Emissions Trading Scheme Directive, supra note 17, arts. 10-11. The
Directive does call for a gradual implementation of auctioned allowances over time. Id.
para. 13.
235.
Kanter & Castle, supra note 20.
236.
Id.
237.
See supra text accompanying notes 232-34 and note 232.
238.
See Kanter & Castle, supra note 20 (noting the agreement to a "drastically
weaker plan to reduce emissions").
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VI. A BOLD PLAN

TO SECURE THE EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY
MARKET IN THE LONG TERM

A. Policymakers Must Lead in Aiding Renewable Energy
Companies Through the Global Downturn
Given the market barriers described in Part II, governments
must intervene to support the private institutions that develop wind
energy if renewable energy is to be successful. Aggressive goals for
wind energy are within the EU's reach if the community acts in a
unified fashion and expands the scope of its Directives beyond the
step-by-step measures that have thus far been the model for change.
The EU must inject a new level of bold support for wind and
renewable energies in the short term. If support is not offered,
investors will shy away from renewable energy investments during
the current economic downturn.
So far, EU leaders have been
unwilling to emerge as such aggressive energy leaders. The slowerthan-expected growth of wind power in markets such as Germany,
Portugal, and the UK is due to, among other things, administrative
barriers and legislative uncertainty. 239 Additionally, the declining
price of oil reduces demand for renewable energy, and tightening
credit markets dry up investments. 240 EU leaders are under pressure
to create jobs-not reduce emissions. 241 In the meantime, companies
across Europe continue to emit greenhouse gases, and climate change
remains an imminent threat.
Despite the global market crash, many investors still see longterm opportunity for profit in renewable energy. 242
The EU
Commission itself said the challenges concerning the future of energy
"call for a comprehensive and ambitious response. '24 3
Private
companies cite the will of European politicians to fight climate change
and reduce dependence on foreign oil as the basis for their interest in
renewables investments. 244 This lasting investor interest proves the
inherent potential value of wind and renewable energy. Further, the
need for strong government support to attract investors is
underscored: With the correct legal framework and legislative action,

239.
GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 30. The report also
mentions a lack of grid access as a cause of slow growth. Id.
240.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
241.
Id.
242.
Tom Wright, Winds Shift for Renewable Energy As Oil Price Sinks, Money
Gets Tight, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2008, at 2.
243.
2007 Renewable Energy Roadmap, supra note 42, at 3.
244.
Wright, supra note 242.
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the EU is in a position to support wind energy in such a way that
wind companies can not only survive the economic collapse, but also
play a key role in retooling member states' economies for the future.
To the extent market failures persist and to the extent wind energy is
most successfully developed where it is supported by government
mechanisms, the future success of wind companies depends even
more heavily on government support during a declining economy and
where oil is relatively cheap.
To successfully implement this new legal framework,
policymakers must view themselves as champions and promoters of
technological advancement and innovation. This new role should
develop in several steps: First, leaders must educate consumers in
their countries about both the costs and benefits of new renewable
energy schemes.
Second, leaders should fulfill their traditional
policymaking roles and pass laws to actually implement the sort of
renewable energy support schemes discussed in subpart B below.
Third, leaders must do an additional "follow up" round of consumer
education, demonstrating the successes of the implemented
mechanisms and drawing conclusions that link job growth, reduced
emissions, etc., back to their renewable energy schemes. Properly
executed, this plan will lead to popular support for the regulatory
schemes over time, and renewable energy production can compete on
the free market with conventional energy technologies free of
government support schemes. An economy with an energy scheme
that is clean, safe, secure, and price-competitive with conventional
energy technology is the very embodiment of one that is retooled for
the future.
Despite calls for green initiatives to be delayed during the global
depression, the political, financial, and legal climates are all perfectly
positioned for European nations to step in and take strong legislative
action that would be welcomed across the continent. To start,
private-equity firms predict positive results for renewable energy
throughout the next decade. 245
Additionally, wind energy is
approaching a competitive price in the market. 246 Prices of wind
turbines are likely to decline during an economic downturn, thereby
diminishing the startup costs of wind farms and making wind energy

245.
Jennifer Bollen, Even As Oil Gets Cheaper, Renewable Buyouts Go On,
WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Oct. 28, 2008, at 2.
246.
Id.
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even more affordable. 247 Analysts worldwide expect to see a "large
''
discount in the prices of [wind] farms during 2009. 248
Thus, policymakers must invest their political capital in wind
farms. These legislators are in a position to take strong action
against climate change, and in doing so will meet the public demand
in Europe for more renewable energy and will support an industry
eager for the government to provide investor certainty.
Wind
companies will welcome tax incentives, infrastructure investments,
and a strong renewables support mechanism to attract these
investors. EU leaders, therefore, are poised to take advantage of the
current economic climate to exploit the rare political situation where
regulatory investment in wind energy poses little risk of political
backlash from either consumers or industry. Once the EU nations
educate, then legislate, and then reeducate, companies will be in a
position to take action quickly.
Regulatory intervention will also ensure continued competition
and innovation in the wind energy arena. Barriers to entry are
consistently high in energy markets, and they are especially so in a
struggling economy where large producers can take advantage of
economies of scale to succeed over small to mid-sized producers.
During difficult economic times, only those renewable energy
companies with strong balance sheets are considered safe
investments, and smaller competitors are expected to be squeezed out
of the picture. 249 The EU cap-and-trade scheme may achieve such
competition, innovation, and growth as the cap on emissions forces
companies to find new, innovative ways to pollute cheaply or pollute
less. However, there is no guarantee these companies will invest in
renewable energy as a way of achieving the required emissions
reductions.
Rather, these companies can simply buy emissions
allowances from other producers and continue emitting the same
amount. It follows that there is no guarantee of progress toward
meeting the binding target of 20% of energy coming from renewable
sources by 2020.
EU leaders and policymakers face an obligation to call attention
to this gap in the recent climate change package. The many
concessions made in the Emissions Trading Directive portion of the
Climate Action and Renewable Energy Package are evidence that

247.
Posting of Keith Johnson to WSJ Blogs: Environmental Capital, Clean
Crunch: Wind Companies Suffer Downturn, Look for Upside, http://blogs.wsj.coml
environmentalcapital2008/11/06/clean-crunch-wind-companies-suffer-downturn-lookfor-upside/ (Nov. 6, 2008, 15:41 EST).
248.
Teresa Rivas, This Utility Will Inherit the Wind, BARRON'S, Dec. 29, 2008
(alteration in original) (citing Macquarie Research analyst Angie Storozynski).
249.
See id. (explaining that the strength of the FPL Group's balance sheets will
help it succeed relative to weaker competitors).
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renewable energy faces a formidable opponent in the traditional
energy lobby. 250 The cries of business, however, can be drowned out
by the cries of the populace. Put differently, any renewable energy
legislation is only as good as the popular support it has behind it.
The duties of the policymaker are challenging but necessary: EU
leaders must push forward public opinion by presenting the problems
posed by the gaps in the cap-and-trade legislation. Next, leaders
must introduce support mechanisms that provide the investor
confidence needed for renewable energy companies to succeed. Third,
in another round of consumer education, leaders must demonstrate
that the new renewable energy schemes are the solution to the
problems created by the cap-and-trade bill. Implemented correctly,
this plan will result in public demand for more legislative solutions to
the climate problem.
This sequence lays the foundation for
policymakers to solve this gap in the current climate legislation by
investing in renewables in a way that allows more entrants into the
market, thereby fostering more competition, more innovation, and
greater increases in the percentage of renewable energy used
throughout the continent.
B. Supplemental Support Mechanisms Are Necessary to
Attract Investment to Small and Mid-Sized Producers
Despite the EU's development of a cap-and-trade scheme, the
downturn in the economy means additional support mechanisms and
infrastructure investment remain necessary to develop a wind energy
industry. A cap-and-trade program may be able to reduce emissions,
but without legislative support in place, investors and entrepreneurs
have no incentive to develop renewable energy.
Due to the
weaknesses in the EU cap-and-trade scheme that allow traditional
power companies to take advantage of legislative carve outs and
continue to pollute, only additional support schemes and investment
incentives will ensure that wind energy's prominence can increase.
Thus, the cap-and-trade scheme is best viewed as the foundation on
which real efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the
increased use of renewable energy can be built.25 ' The goal of 20%
renewable by 2020 in the EU plan will be difficult to meet in the
declining economy if small renewable energy companies are not
supported in a way that ensures competition and innovation.
Spain serves as an example that pricing and infrastructure
support are catalysts for wind market development. Despite the

250.
2009 Emissions Trading Scheme Directive, supra note 17.
251.
See Piebalgs, supra note 38 (describing the trading scheme as such a
foundation).
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down economy, wind energy companies made major expansions into
Spain as recently as January 2009.252 Business leaders call Spain
one of the most attractive wind markets in Europe. 25 3 Spain utilizes
a feed-in tariff program to support the price of renewable
electricity. 254 Such multi-year commitments to expansion directly
support the assertion that FITs or other government investment are
needed in addition to the cap-and-trade scheme if Europe is to meet
its 20% renewable energy goal.
EWEA officials have argued the new EU climate package
2 55
provides sufficient incentives for investment in the wind energy.
However, this argument requires the assumption that the Directive
will provide an incentive for the national governments to put in place
financial frameworks, administrative rules and accessible grids in
order to meet their binding national targets. While it may be true
that the Member States will act in such a way, an efficient
administrative process and an accessible grid will not be enough to
attract investment in wind energy. Grid access and the reduction of
administrative barriers may make investment appear less
burdensome in the short term but do nothing to provide a long-term
foundation of stability for investors. Rather, a tight credit market
requires that investors be assured not just of a reduction in barriers
to entry, but also of strong prospects for long-range profitability. The
situation therefore calls for a stronger foundation of FITs and price
stabilization to truly attract high amounts of capital in the short
term.
C. Investment in Wind Will Mitigate Concerns that Jobs and
the Economy Must Take Precedence over Fighting
Climate Change
Wind gives European leaders the opportunity to provide energy
that is not only clean but also cheap. Whereas the price of energy
produced from fossil fuel is sharply volatile, wind energy is virtually
free.
Furthermore, a recent study of wind-generation data in
Germany from 2006 to 2008 found significant cost savings
potential. 256 The study found an average yearly savings of one billion

252.
Press Release, RWE Innogy, RWE Innogy Expands Wind Farm Portfolio in
Spain (Jan. 6, 2009), available at http://www.rwe.com/web/cms/en/86182/rweinnogyfnews-press/press/?pmid=4002859.
253.
Id.
254.
Id.
255.
EWEA Chief: EU Legislation Set to Boost Wind Industry, supra note 55.
256.
Hannes Weigt, Germany's Wind Energy: The Potential for Fossil Capacity
Replacement and Cost Saving, 38 APPLIED ENERGY 1857 (2009).
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Euros due to the availability of wind energy. 25 7 Given that wind
energy has no fuel costs, it is especially cheap during peak demand
periods. 258 Wind was even found to be cost effective when taking into
259
account the additional price consumers pay due to feed-in tariffs.
Additionally, government support for renewable energy can lead to
the development of entire new industries and the jobs they create.
Here, history serves as an example. Beginning in 2000, Germany
developed a feed-in tariff scheme for the production of solar energy. 260
As a result of those tariffs, the solar energy industry created 60,000
new jobs in Germany alone during the five-year period from 2000 to
2005.261 These results undermine the arguments of critics who say
economic concerns must take precedence over legislative attention to
climate change. Rather, cheaper energy is likely to stimulate the
economy. Those 60,000 new jobs in Germany increased the installed
capacity of wind energy in Europe from 48 megawatts in 1990, to
4500 megawatts in 2000, and to 20,622 megawatts at the beginning of
2007.262 Importantly, 21,000 megawatts of cheaper renewable energy
frees up assets normally expended on utilities and will lead to more
disposable income, which can be spent in the market and will also
help create jobs.
Thus, the job-creating potential of wind energy is two-fold: First,
jobs are created when governments invest in promoting new start-up
wind farms; second, relatively inexpensive wind energy increases
disposable income, which results in increased consumer spending and
subsequent job creation. Additionally, new jobs will come in forms
other than just those created by the construction of wind farms.
Work must be done to create a competent grid system that provides
access for renewable energy producers to sell their electricity. Such
massive infrastructure undertakings can provide thousands of new
jobs. 26 3 Furthermore, jobs will be created in the public sector as
government spending on renewable energy is monitored and as
permits and other administrative procedures for the development of
new wind farms are implemented. Government investment in wind
energy can simultaneously mean both economic recovery for a
country as well as cleaner air and a more secure energy supply for its
citizens.
Policymakers face a rare win-win situation, which, if
squandered, will have adverse impacts on both the economy and the
environment.

257.
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260.
261.
262.
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LAUBER, supra note 114, at 19-20.
Id. at 20.
Butler & Neuoff, supra note 124, at 1858.
See e.g., supratext accompanying note 261.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Europe may still claim a role as a global leader in combating
climate change. On December 7, 2009, officials from close to 200
2 64
countries will meet in Copenhagen for the UN Climate Conference.
The event will be one of the most significant international gatherings
in history. 265 Conference participants face the daunting task of
negotiating a global solution to the greenhouse gas problem. Those
European energy leaders who still believe that Europe has a role in
providing a sustainable energy model for the rest of the world to
follow 2 66 are certainly correct. Within the time span of a single
generation, Europe has the possibility of achieving a clean, secure,
and independent system for renewable energy. 267 Those who criticize
the concessions to business and other failures of the 2009 Climate
Action and Renewable Energy Package do not make their claims
without merit. 268 However, more sensational reactions predicting the
death of Europe's ability to lead in the renewable energy arena 269 are
not grounded in sound legal or policy strategy. The failures of the
Emissions Trading Scheme Directive do not write the fate of the
Renewable Energy Directive. Neither does the latter Directive secure
its doom by its own words. Rather, room remains for additional
government injection of support.
Additionally, the emissions
reduction plan, while flawed, shows that the political will to fashion
an EU-wide plan for renewable energy support is far from
unavailable.
A new roadmap is clear: Policymakers no longer need to view the
environmental demand to curb greenhouse gas emissions and the
economic demand to create jobs as mutually exclusive goals in
irreconcilable tension. Rather, government-induced development of
renewable energy both creates jobs and retools nations' economies for
long-term stability. Such development of a disadvantaged technology
requires government intervention in a market stricken with
externalities.
Thus, strong spending-ideally on a confidence-
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UN Climate Conference: The Countdown to Copenhagen, INDEP. (London),
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267.
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available at
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the garden path.") (quoting Dir. Blanken).
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creating FIT scheme-both creates jobs and reduces emissions.
These economic times call for the most efficient implementation
possible, and the development of a harmonized community-wide
scheme will provide never before seen economies of scale. The
pathway for such a harmonized scheme is already laid in the form of
the community-wide cap-and-trade scheme. Finally, the removal of
administrative barriers and development of a grid that provides
readily available access to producers of renewable energy ensures
that producers are able to maximize the benefit of government
expenditures.
Nothing is preventing EU regulators, legislators, and other
policymakers from seizing on the unique possibilities presented by
the current challenges in a way that allows the EU to serve as an
exemplary model for the world in December 2009.
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